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SPECIAL SESSION SUMMARY
Time is More Precious than Money
Stephen A. Spiller, Duke University, USA
SESSION OVERVIEW
The allocation of time and money is fundamental to consumer
behavior. Previous research comparing time and money has fo-
cused on identifying systematic differences in consumers’ percep-
tions and has found that time and money differ in their value
ambiguity (Okada and Hoch, 2004), perceived future availability
(Zauberman and Lynch, 2005), and degree of personal connection
(Mogilner and Aaker, 2009). The four papers in this session
advance this research by considering antecedents and implications
of the underlying differences between time and money and focusing
on time’s unique role in decision making as a particularly precious
resource. We examine its unanticipated scarcity (Spiller and Lynch),
its self-expressive value (Reed, Aquino, Levy, and Finnel), its
implications for the pursuit of happiness (Mogilner), and its role in
promoting preference stability (Lee, Lee, and Zauberman).
First, Spiller and Lynch consider why consumers have less
time than expected, but not less money. They find that consumers
exhibit a greater planning fallacy for time than for money because
they plan more for their use of time than money. Next, Reed and
colleagues examine why an active moral identity leads to a prefer-
ence to donate time rather than money and find that donating time
is more self-expressive than donating money. Moreover, they
consider how this preference for time versus money differs depend-
ing on whether the donation is real or hypothetical. The final two
papers build on the finding that the mere concept of time increases
the weight consumers put on personal connection (Mogilner and
Aaker, 2009). First, Mogilner shows that when time rather than
money is activated, individuals are more likely to pursue consump-
tion that leads to greater happiness. Finally, Lee and colleagues find
that although time’s value may be more ambiguous than money’s,
preferences are more stable when time (rather than money) is the
resource of exchange, due to its emotional tags.
EXTENDED ABSTRACTS
“Consumers Exhibit the Planning Fallacy for Time but not
Money”
Stephen A. Spiller, Duke University, USA
John G. Lynch Jr., University of Colorado, Boulder, USA
The planning fallacy has been defined as “the fact that people
invariably underestimate the resources, such as time and money,
that will be required to finish a project” (Taylor, Pham, Rivkin, and
Armor, 1998, p. 434). Although a planning fallacy for money has
been referenced by other researchers (e.g., Kahneman and Tversky,
1979; Kruger and Evans, 2004), empirical research at the personal
level has focused exclusively on time plans. Given important
differences in perceptions of time and money (e.g., Mogilner and
Aaker, 2009; Okada and Hoch, 2004; Zauberman and Lynch,
2005), we pose the question: Does the personal planning fallacy
apply to money as it does to time?
Some existing evidence suggests it does not. If individuals
expect to spend less time and less money on projects than they
actually spend, they will overestimate the amount of “time slack”
and “money slack” they have left. Zauberman and Lynch (2005)
find that although people overestimate their future time slack, they
do not overestimate their future money slack, suggesting the
absence of a planning fallacy for money. More direct evidence
comes from Kruger and Evans (2004, Study 1), who found that
decomposing a project (e.g., holiday gift shopping) into its compo-
nent parts (e.g., each person on the list) increased predictions of the
amount of time to be spent by more than 30% but only increased
predictions of the amount of money to be spent by less than 10%.
These findings lead us to hypothesize that individuals exhibit the
planning fallacy for time but not for money (H1). We test H1 in
Studies 1, 2, and 3.
In Study 1, 2078 members of an online panel reported how
much and how frequently they exhibit the planning fallacy for time
or money. In support of H1, participants reported exhibiting a
greater and more frequent planning fallacy for time than for money.
In Study 2, 93 undergraduates listed short-run and long-run
plans for their uses of time and money and reported when they
would finish their time plans and how much money they would
spend on their money plans. They later reported when they com-
pleted their time plans and how much money they spent on their
money plans. In support of H1, participants completed their time
plans later than planned, but spent less money than planned on their
money plans.
The generally accepted explanation for the planning fallacy is
that planners focus too much on how they will successfully execute
their plan (they take the “inside perspective”), and neglect distribu-
tional information of past planning failures and future potential
obstacles (they ignore the “outside perspective”; Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979; Buehler, Griffin, and Ross, 1994). As a result,
planning more leads to a greater planning fallacy. Although this
inside versus outside distinction applies equally to time and money
plans, people may be more likely to take the inside perspective for
time than for money. Lynch, Netemeyer, Spiller, and Zammit
(2009) develop and validate a measure of propensity to plan with
parallel versions for time and money planning in the short-run and
long-run. They find that individuals have a greater propensity to
plan for time than for money, suggesting that individuals are more
likely to take the inside perspective for time than for money. These
findings lead us to hypothesize that individuals with a greater
propensity to plan exhibit a greater planning fallacy (H2) and
propensity to plan mediates the cross-resource difference in the
planning fallacy (H3). We test H2 and H3 in Study 3.
In Study 3, 90 MBA students were asked when they planned
to finish their holiday gift shopping, how much money they would
spend on their holiday gift shopping, or both. Every day, they
reported whether they went shopping the previous day and if they
did go shopping, how much money they spent. In support of H1,
participants exhibited the planning fallacy for time but not for
money. In support of H2, participants with a greater propensity to
plan exhibited a greater planning fallacy than those with a lesser
propensity to plan. In support of H3, the cross-resource difference
in the planning fallacy was mediated by propensity to plan; control-
ling for propensity to plan, there was no difference in the planning
fallacy for time versus money.
This work provides the first systematic comparison of the
degree to which consumers exhibit the planning fallacy for time and
money and links it to existing work on the “inside perspective.” Due
to differences in propensity to plan, consumers exhibit a greater
planning fallacy for time than for money, leaving them with less
time than expected but not less money and thus making their limited
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remaining time all the more precious. This research also reveals a
“dark-side” to the propensity to plan, which might otherwise be
viewed a priori as a primarily positive trait.
“How and When the Moral Self Motivates Donations of
Time versus Money”
Americus Reed II, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Karl Aquino, University of British Columbia, Canada
Eric Levy, University of Washington, USA
Stephanie Finnel, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Donating time and donating money appear equivalent, but
consumers treat them differently (Liu and Aaker 2008). Consumers
prefer giving time versus an equivalent amount of money when
their moral identity is either consistently central to their self-
concept or temporarily primed (Reed, Aquino, and Levy 2007).
Reed et al. (2007) hypothesized that this effect occurs because
emphasizing moral identity makes consumers choose behaviors
that express that identity. Giving time (vs. money) should be seen
as more expressive of the moral self because it entails greater
contact with needy others and hence greater willingness to sacrifice
for them. This concern for others characterizes the moral self
(Aquino and Reed 2002).
However, Reed et al. (2007) did not directly test their reason-
ing for why consumers with an activated moral identity prefer
giving time versus money; something unrelated to self-expressive-
ness could be driving their results. We propose the following self-
expressiveness hypothesis: activating moral identity strengthens
consumers’ belief that giving to charity expresses who they are, and
this belief makes them prefer giving time, an act more consistent
with the moral identity they want to express than giving money.
But do these self-expressive benefits mean moral identity will
always make consumers prefer giving time versus money in real
donations? Past research cannot address this question because it
considered hypothetical preferences, but we suspect the answer is
no. Unlike money, time cannot be replenished through work. Thus
consumers may perceive time as scarcer than money and may view
giving time as costlier than giving money. They may report a
hypothetical preference to give time to express their moral self but
be unwilling to bear the costs of giving real time (cf. Batson and
Thompson 2001). Both internal (moral identity centrality) and
external (temporary moral identity priming) sources of moral
motivation, rather than just one as in previous work, may be
necessary to induce giving real time versus money. We call this the
real donation hypothesis.
Study 1 tested the self-expressiveness hypothesis. The study
was a 2 (moral identity prime: high versus low) x 2 (effort: moral
versus non-moral) between-subjects design. University partici-
pants (N=183) completed two tasks. In the first task, moral identity
was primed (Reed et al. 2007). Participants copied words and used
them to write a story. In the high (low) moral identity prime
condition, the words were traits related (unrelated) to being moral
such as compassionate (carefree) (Aquino and Reed 2002). In the
second task, participants imagined contributing to an organiza-
tional effort. They indicated how self-expressive contributing would
be and chose from three hypothetical options: giving $5, giving $5
worth of time, or giving nothing. Following Reed et al. (2007), we
manipulated the effort’s perceived morality because the identity
prime was expected to affect time versus money preferences for a
moral but not a non-moral cause. In the moral (non-moral) effort
condition, the effort’s objective was to promote volunteering (sell
advertising services). Manipulation checks confirmed both ma-
nipulations’ effectiveness. Analyses on both dependent measures
(self-expressiveness and donation preferences) revealed a moral
identity prime x effort interaction such that priming moral identity
led participants to view contributing as more self-expressive and to
prefer giving time versus money for moral effort but not non-moral
effort,. Importantly, self-expressiveness mediated the relationship
between the moral identity prime x effort interaction and donation
preferences, supporting the self-expressiveness hypothesis.
Study 2 tested the real donation hypothesis. The study was a
two-group (moral identity prime: high versus low) between-sub-
jects design with moral identity centrality measured. University
participants (N=105) completed three tasks. The first task con-
tained Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity centrality scale.
The second task primed moral identity using slide shows. The high
moral prime show contained photographs of historical figures
acknowledged to be moral (e.g., Gandhi) and of ordinary people
expressing concern for each other. The low moral prime show
contained photographs of flowers. Manipulation checks confirmed
the primes’ effectiveness. In the third task, all participants read the
moral effort description from study 1 and received a real donation
opportunity. They chose from three options: give part of their $10
participation payment to the effort, spend time after the experiment
aiding the effort, or do nothing. Participants were debriefed after-
ward and did not really donate. Our analyses of the donation
decision revealed a centrality x prime interaction such that higher
moral identity centrality increased preference to give time versus
money in the high but not low moral prime condition. In support of
the real donation hypothesis, both sources of moral motivation were
needed to elicit preferences to give real time versus money.
“The Role of Time versus Money in the Pursuit of
Happiness”
Cassie Mogilner, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Money is assumed to be critical for pursuit of the American
Dream and our unalienable right to be happy. Indeed, when a
sample of 127 American university students were asked to share
their feelings related to money, “happiness” was the most fre-
quently cited emotion. However, psychology research reveals there
to be a weak relationship between money and happiness (e.g.,
Kahneman et al. 2006), and economists have found Americans’
happiness levels to have remained constant over the past several
decades despite an increase in financial wealth (Easterlin 1995).
How can we reconcile the assumed association between money and
happiness with empirical demonstrations suggesting the two to be
largely unrelated?
Exploring the role of our other principle resource, time, may
shed some light. An investigation into national allocations of time
reveals that while wealth in the U.S. has increased over the last
quarter of a century, so too has the number of hours Americans have
spent working. In contrast, Europeans have decreased the number
of hours spent at work in response to gains in economic wealth, and
their happiness levels have increased (Layard 2005). This high-
lights the possibility that Americans’ extant focus on money as the
resource most critical to attaining happiness has been misdirected,
and we should instead shift our focus towards time.
To explore this possibility, I conducted four lab and field
experiments testing whether directing attention to time (rather than
money) can improve Americans’ pursuit of happiness by driving
individuals to behave in ways that prior research indicates increase
experienced happiness.
Prior research has found that individuals feel greater happi-
ness having spent money to acquire an experience than having spent
money to acquire a material possession (Van Boven and Gilovich
2003). Experiments 1A and 1B were conducted to test the hypoth-
esis that increasing the relative salience of time (vs. money) would
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increase individuals’ tendencies to choose purchases associated
with greater happiness.
In experiment 1A, participants were primed with either time or
money through incidental exposure to time- or money-related
advertisements, and then they were presented with a series of
choices between experiential and material purchases. In line with
greater happiness, participants who were primed with time (vs.
money) were more likely to choose experiential purchases over
material purchases. Experiment 1B then demonstrated the robust-
ness of the finding, showing that the effect occurs with an even more
subtle prime of time (vs. money) and extends from tradeoffs that
participants thought they would make to a choice with real conse-
quence.
With evidence suggesting that activating time (vs. money) can
lead people to spend their money in ways associated with greater
happiness, experiments 2A and 2B were conducted to test whether
priming time (vs. money) would also lead individuals to choose to
spend their time in ways associated with greater happiness.
Prior research tracked how a national sample of Americans
spent their days, as well as how they felt over the course of their
days, and found people to be most happy when socializing and
during intimate relations, and to be least happy when working and
commuting (Kahneman et al. 2004). Participants in experiment 2A
were nonconsciously primed with either time or money using a
sentence scramble task, and then asked them to report the extent to
which they planned to engage in various activities during the next
24 hours. The results revealed that participants primed with time
(vs. money) planned to spend more time engaging in intimate
relations and socializing (daily activities associated with greater
happiness) and less time working and commuting (daily activities
associated with less happiness).
Experiment 2B was a field experiment conducted to test
whether such a subtle activation of time (vs. money) could not only
impact how individuals plan to spend their time, but also how they
actually spend their time. Upon entering a campus café, students
were implicitly primed with either time or money while volunteer-
ing to complete a sentence scramble task. Those primed with time
subsequently spent more time at the café socializing than doing
schoolwork, whereas students primed with money spent more time
doing schoolwork than socializing.
Together, these findings demonstrate that drawing individu-
als’ attention to time, rather than money, increases their tendencies
to spend both their money and their time in ways that are associated
with greater happiness. This work contributes to the growing
streams of research on time, money, and happiness.
“The Stability of Time versus Money Valuations”
Leonard Lee, Columbia University, USA
Michelle Lee, Singapore Management University, Singapore
Gal Zauberman, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Consumers make decisions about the expenditure of time and
money on a daily basis. In this work, we examine the stability of
consumer valuations of time versus money across different choice
occasions. By stability, we specifically refer to whether there is
consistency (or transitivity) in expressed valuations of time versus
money—transitivity is lacking when, for instance, one prefers A to
B, and B to C, but then contradictorily prefers C to A.
In two experiments, we tested two competing hypotheses. On
the one hand, prior research that has examined time-money differ-
ences (e.g. Okada and Hoch 2004, Zauberman and Lynch 2005)
points toward relatively greater ambiguity in time valuation versus
money valuation, which may in turn translate to less stability in
expressed valuations of time. On the other hand, a separate stream
of research suggests that there could be less stability in expressed
valuations of money, given that (1) affective processing of choice
options has been found to generate greater preference consistency
than more deliberate cognitive processing (Lee, Amir, and Ariely
2009); (2) money (vs. time) is likely to invoke more analytical as
opposed to holistic thinking; and (3) time considerations naturally
evokes more emotional responses than money considerations
(Mogilner and Aaker 2009).
In experiment 1, 166 US student participants studied a set of
nine different flight options for an upcoming international trip they
had to make. They were subsequently shown all pair-wise combi-
nations of these nine flight options (36 pairs) and asked to choose
their preferred option within each pair. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of three conditions: time, money, control. Across
conditions, they were given different information about these flight
options: in the control condition, each option was represented by
both a service rating and an in-flight entertainment rating; addition-
ally, the air fare of each option was also given in the money
condition whereas the average one-way flight time was given in the
time condition instead. The results revealed that participants in the
money condition made significantly more intransitivity errors than
both participants in the time condition and the control condition.
Participants in the time condition, however, were equally consistent
in their choices as those in the control condition. The results also
indicated that the different degrees of choice consistency across
conditions could not be sufficiently explained by any real or
perceived differential difficulty of the choice task.
Experiment 2 conceptually replicated this basic result using a
different experimental design and a different set of choice stimuli.
Seventy-eight participants were asked to suppose that they had to
purchase a photo essay software package for an important project.
They were first shown a set of nine different software options
represented by four attributes (software features, software quality,
set-up time, and price) and then given all binary combinations of
these nine software options (36 pairs) and asked to choose their
preferred option within each pair. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of three conditions: time, money, or control. Unlike
experiment 1, participants were shown all four attributes, but which
attribute values differed across the product options depended on the
condition to which they were assigned: in the control condition,
only features rating (1-5) and quality rating (1-5) differed across
options while the set-up time and the price of the options were held
constant; in the money condition, features rating, quality rating, and
price varied across options while set-up time was held constant; in
the time condition, features rating, quality rating, and set-up time
varied across options while price was held constant. As such,
different attributes were made relatively more salient to partici-
pants across conditions, hence inducing different degrees of consid-
eration across attributes. To ensure similar magnitudes of attribute
values for time and price, we used an implied conversion rate of 1
additional minute of set-up time for $1 of price reduction.
Again, the results demonstrated that participants in the money
condition made significantly more transitivity violations than those
in the control condition and those in the time condition. Additional
data indicated that participants did not perceive any differences in
the variability of the given product options across conditions.
Together, these results provide convergent evidence that pref-
erences based on time are more consistent than preferences based
on money. We believe that our research provides a unique test of
two competing processes underlying time versus money consider-
ations. Furthermore, it furthers our understanding of the relation-
ship between mental representation of outcomes and type of infor-
mation processing (affective versus deliberative), as well as how
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consumers form preferences based on two fundamental economic
resources.
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